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1. Introduction 
 
In most developed countries, there has been a rising trend in health expenditures. The 
growth rates of the health expenditures are generally higher than the growth of the overall 
economy. As a result, the ratio of the health expenditure to the GDP has been rising 
continuously. The percentage of health expenditures in the GDP was 3.8% in 1960 for OECD 
countries and has been continuously increasing since then.1. The trends in US and in most 
other countries have been similar. In the US, the ratio of health expenditures to the GDP rose 
from 5.1% in 1960 to 15.3% in 2005. Moreover, there is a significant variation in health 
expenditures among the relatively homogenous regions like OECD member countries or US 
states. For example, while the UK devoted only 8.3% of her GDP to the health care in 2005, 
the US spent almost twice.2 In the US, average per capita health expenditures for the period 
1993-2004 ranged from $2,972 for Idaho to $8,738 for District of Columbia.3 
This significant variation in health care spending begs an explanation. Different 
societies might have different demand levels for health services or might have diverse health 
care “needs” due to the differences in life style, environmental conditions, or genetic 
characteristics. Alternatively, perhaps health care systems are not managed as efficiently as 
possible everywhere.  Health care markets are poised with numerous problems such as moral 
hazard, principal-agent problems, and information failures. Any of these problems can cause 
markets to operate inefficiently.  When we look at the details of the health care spending, we 
see that the inefficient management of health care systems is highly possible. For example, 
pharmaceutical spending makes up only 9.4% of the total health expenditure in Norway, 
while the same figure is 29.4% in Poland. Even if the variation in input choice for the health 
care (production function) does not mean inefficiency per se, the size of this variation raises a 
question mark. Indeed Baicker and Sandar (2004) and Fisher et al (2003a, 2003b) conclude 
that higher spending in health care does not improve health outcomes or patient satisfaction 
level. Thus, academics and policy makers have been analyzing the health care markets and 
trying to understand the driving factors behind the continuing increase in health expenditures 
for decades. In this paper, we contribute to the literature by analyzing the influence of 
technological improvement in pharmaceutical markets on health spending levels using panel 
data for US States.  
                                               
1
 The ratios of the health expenditures to the GDP for 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2004 were 5.0%, 6.7%, 6.9%, 
7.9%, and 9.0%, respectively. These numbers are un-weighted averages of current OECD member countries 
2
 See OECD Health Data 2007. 
3
 See Table 1. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we discuss some 
background information and previous literature about the rising health expenditures. Section 3 
summarizes the significance of pharmaceuticals on medical markets and on rising health 
expenditures. Sections 4 and 5 present the data and empirical methodology, respectively. We 
discuss the results in Section 6 and conclude in section 7. 
 
2. Rise in Health Expenditures and New Technologies 
Several explanations for the rising health expenditures have been cited in the health 
economics literature. Primary explanation is the rising incomes. Wealthier individuals are 
willing to pay more for their health, i.e. health care is a normal good. An increasing amount of 
spending on health care is a natural result of economic growth. Almost all studies analyzing 
the health care costs found a positive relationship between per capita income and health 
spending.4  In fact, earlier studies conclude that income differences can explain almost all of 
the variation in the spending levels. Another reason for rising health spending is the aging 
societies. Generally old and very old require much more health care than young and middle-
aged. Many studies use the percentage of population over 65 as a proxy for this demographic 
shift. Most studies have concluded that aging societies are spending more on health services5. 
Insurance coverage is another explanation cited in the literature. As it is common in many 
markets, insurance coverage can cause moral hazard problems. The individuals, who do not 
pay for the whole costs of the services they get, tend to use more health care than the efficient 
level. However, insurance firms are also better equipped than individual patients against the 
health care suppliers. Specifically, they can use their market power to get favorable terms 
because they can buy health services in bulk. Moreover, they can take much stronger 
measures than the individual patients against the advantages of the suppliers due to 
asymmetric information.   
However, rising income levels, demographic shift and increased insurance coverage 
can only explain a relatively small portion of the rise in health expenditures. Slade and 
Anderson (2001) note that there is nearly a consensus among health economists that a 
substantial portion of the increase in health care spending is due to diffusion of new medical 
technologies. According to Newhouse (1992), usual suspects (supplier induced demand, aging 
population, income growth, increased insurance) can explain approximately half of the rise in 
the health expenditures. He conjectures that the rest of the increase should be given to 
                                               
4
 See Gerdtham and Jonsson (2000) for a good review. 
5
 See for example Gerdtham and et all (1992) 
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technological improvement in health services. Cutler et al. (1998) explains the significance of 
the technological improvement on health spending with the following sentences: 
 
“Nonetheless, it has now achieved a degree of acceptance, in part because it is difficult 
to think of another factor that is common across six consecutive decades and across 
many countries with different health-care financing institutions. Here we accept for 
the sake of argument that a substantial portion of the spending rise is attributable to 
the increased capabilities of medicine and ask what the spending increases-and 
inferentially the increased capabilities-have bought.” 
 
Cutler and Mcgellan (2001) classify the effects of new technologies into two groups: 
They use the term “treatment substitution effects” to indicate that new technologies often 
substitute for older technologies. The treatment costs of these new technologies maybe higher 
or lower than old technologies. However, new technologies in medicine also make treatment 
possible for patients who were not able to get treatment with old technologies. For example, 
new surgical techniques made it possible to operate on very old patients. Cutler and Mcgellan 
call this “treatment expansion effect”. They note that the diagnosis rates for depression 
doubled after Prozac-like drugs became available, and cataract surgery was performed much 
more frequently as the procedure improved. When the new treatment is effective, making it 
available for more people is beneficial, but this would almost certainly increase the health 
care spending.6 It is believed that the treatment expansion effect is a major factor in both the 
benefits of technological innovation and cost-increase.   
Health economists usually presume that new technologies increase health 
expenditures, because they are usually more expensive than the older technologies they 
replace and they also expand the relevant market size, but the benefits are worth the extra 
expense.  Even posing the question of whether the new technologies are worth the extra cost 
would be peculiar for other markets. Interactions of utility maximizing individuals and profit 
maximizing firms would result in an equilibrium at which all questions are answered 
automatically. However, even the most free-markets oriented economist would not claim that 
the markets would make efficient allocation of resources in medical care.  
                                               
6
 However, it is also possible that a new technology might lower the overall health spending by substantially 
reducing other types of medical spending. For example Garber (2006) notes that the introduction of polio 
vaccine made iron lung obsolete and eliminated all relevant medical expenses.  
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The problems like moral hazard (patients pay only a fraction of the whole medical bill, 
so they tend to overuse the medical services), supplier induced demand (suppliers have the 
incentive and ability to increase the utilization of health services), principal-agent problem 
(the interests of decision makers [generally doctors] do not coincide 100% with the principles 
[hospitals, patients or insurance companies]), and asymmetric information (patients know 
much less about their conditions and what would happen if they don’t listen to the doctor’s 
recommendation)  make it necessary to study the potential benefits and costs of new 
technologies very carefully.  
Hedonic methods have been used to measure the valuation of the new products and 
technologies in many markets. However, usually customers of new technologies in health care 
markets (patients) have insufficient information (one might say ignorant) about the effects of 
new technologies. This makes it almost impossible to use hedonic techniques. Therefore, 
most studies focus on the cost of new technologies in terms of higher spending and compare 
these costs to the quantifiable health effects of the technologies, such as declines in mortality. 
For example, Cutler and Mcgellan (2001) analyze new technologies in the treatment of five 
conditions: heart attacks, low-birth weight infants, depression, cataracts and breast cancer. 
They conclude that the estimated benefits of new technologies are much greater than the costs 
for all conditions except breast cancer. The costs and benefits of the technological change in 
breast cancer are approximately of equal magnitude. 
 
3. Pharmaceuticals 
Pharmaceuticals have been getting more attention than other types of medical services 
for a number of reasons.  First, the share of pharmaceutical spending on the total health 
expenditures has been rising in the US and in many other OECD countries since 1980s. In the 
US, the share of pharmaceutical drugs increased from historical lows of 8.7% in 1982 to 
12.4% in 2005. Similarly, the share of pharmaceuticals on public agencies’ budgets has been 
increasing. Duggan and Evans (2007) note that between 1995 and 2004, the fraction of 
Medicaid costs on prescription drugs nearly doubled, from 7.4% to 13.7%. Most of this 
increase was due to expensive new treatments. Average Medicaid prescription cost has risen 
by 90% since 1995. Lichtenberg (2000) cites the Barents Group study for National Institute 
for Health care Management (1999) which estimates that 42% of the drug costs between 1993 
and 1998 were due to newer drugs costing more than older drugs. According to that study, the 
average 1998 price for drugs introduced in 1992 or later was $71.49 per prescription, 
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compared to $30.47 for previously existing drugs. Naturally, the policymakers who are 
desperate to implement cost-containment strategies have focused on pharmaceuticals.  
Moreover, pharmaceutical drugs market is relatively concentrated with small number of large 
multinational firms. So politically it is easier to focus on relatively few and very visible firms 
than focusing on neighborhood doctors and hospitals.  
Pharmaceutical companies have been very active on pushing “technological 
improvement” on medical care. The pharmaceutical sector is one of the leading industries in 
terms of R&D investment to revenue ratios. Drug companies use patents very effectively to 
recover the fixed R&D costs. However, “monopolistic”7 structure of the market due to patents 
creates the perception that pharmaceutical companies are making excessive profits.8  
Moreover, they make exaggerated claims about the merits of the new drugs for marketing 
purposes. These claims coupled with the “insider stories” of “dirty secrets” of pharmaceutical 
companies have created doubts about the value of the new drugs.  
Like other types of technological improvements in the health care markets, newer 
drugs can have ambiguous effects on the total health spending. Generally, newer drugs are 
substantially more expensive than their predecessors and possibly, they would increase 
overall spending. On the other hand, improvements in health outcomes due to their effective 
use could reduce the need (or demand) for other types of medical care, such as hospital visits 
and nursing home care, which could decrease the total spending on medical care.   
Numerous studies have been published about the value of the new drugs. Most studies 
focused on the effects of specific drugs on health outcomes and health expenditures. Hudson 
et al (2003) surveys the papers studying the effect of the use of second-generation 
antipsychotic medications health care costs. The majority of surveyed studies found that 
second–generation antipsychotic drugs are either cost-neutral or reducing costs.  
Duggan and Evans (2007) used the administrative data of Medicaid to estimate the 
effect of antiretroviral drugs for HIV on health care spending and health outcomes. They 
exploited the differential take-up of antiretroviral drugs at individual level. Their results 
suggest that new drugs not only lower the mortality rate by 68% but they also decrease the 
short-term health care spending by reducing expenditures on other categories of medical care. 
The average lifetime Medicaid spending on AIDS patients has increased from $89,000 to 
                                               
7
 We do not claim that the drug companies are monopolies in technical sense. We mean that there is such a 
perception.  
8
 Grabowski and et. all (2002) showed that is not the case. 
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$234,000, however, because AIDS patients live longer and require more medical care in the 
long run. 
Lichtenberg has published a series of articles on the values of new drugs using various 
data sources and methodologies. His studies confirm the proposition that new drugs are not 
only useful in terms of better health outcomes but they also lower the health expenditures. 
Lichtenberg (1996) uses US data at disease level. He compares the health outcomes, health 
expenditures and utilization of different health inputs (such as hospital admissions, physician 
visits etc…) between 1980 and 1991. In addition, he analyzes the effects of using relatively 
new drugs for different diseases on health outcomes and health expenditures. He concludes 
that a $1 increase in pharmaceutical expenditure reduces total health care expenditures by 
$2.65. In Lichtenberg (2001), he uses person-, condition-, and event-level data to study the 
effect of drug age on total medical expenditure and mortality. Lichtenberg updates this study 
using person condition level data in Lichtenberg (2002) which gives very similar results.  
Lichtenberg (2006) focuses on HIV treatments using US national data for the period 
1982-2001. He estimates that the increased utilization of HIV drugs increases the medical 
care expenditures by $3,530 per AIDS patient, but it also increases the life expectancy of 
AIDS patients by 13.6 years. Thus, the medical cost per additional life-year due to increased 
utilization of HIV drugs is $17,175.9 However, this method does not allow for differential 
effectiveness of old and new HIV drugs. Presumably, the newer drugs are more effective on 
lowering mortality and keeping patients out of hospitals. Thus, he concludes that $17,175 per 
saved life-year is the upper bound for HIV drugs. However, in another study Duggan (2005) 
finds that newer antipsychotic drugs have not reduced health spending.  According to his 
estimates, 610% increase in Medicaid spending on antipsychotic drugs has not reduced 
spending on other types of medical care during 1993-2001 period. Thus, newer drugs have 
increased total health costs. 
The conclusions of the studies on the value of technological improvement and new 
drugs have significant policy implications. If the new drugs are cost effective per saved life-
years, the policies that would reduce the pharmaceutical R&D should be evaluated very 
carefully. Price regulations, allowing drug importations, putting restrictions on intellectual 
property rights and other similar regulations are shown to be affecting pharmaceutical 
companies’ R&D and marketing decisions10.  
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 Lichtenberg (2006) notes that according to Murphy and Topel (2003), average value of US life-year is on the 
order of $150,000.  
10
 See Civan and Maloney (2006), Acemoglu and Linn(2004 ) and Danzon et all (2005) for specific examples.   
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Generally, patient/event/disease level data are used in the previous studies. These 
studies try to control for the endogeneity of the drug use. Generally, newer drugs are first 
prescribed and used on the patients who are relatively sicker than the average patient. 
Therefore, their health care spending is higher than the average patient. Even though there 
have been several approaches to consider this problem, we believe that the individual level 
patient characteristics are very difficult to control. Thus in this study we are using state level 
aggregate health spending data.11 More importantly using aggregate state level data allows us 
to analyze the treatment expansion effects of newer drugs. Studies that use disease level data 
also encounter with spillover effects of the diseases. Certain diseases make the patients 
vulnerable to other ones. Therefore, treatment of a disease might have extra benefits due to 
spillover effects to other diseases. One should not overlook those crossover effects.  
Moreover, we use a general proxy to determine the technological level of drugs: the number 
of years passed since it was first approved by FDA. Most other studies selected specific drugs 
and analyzed the effects of prescription patterns of these drugs on health spending12. Even if 
the choice of those drugs is far from arbitrary, relatively ad hoc character of this methodology 
makes it harder to generalize the conclusions. Finally, we use US State level panel data unlike 
most other studies on the health expenditure issue that use international (usually OECD) data. 
As Wang and Rettenmaier (2006) point out, one advantage of US State data over international 
data is that the US states are less heterogeneous in terms of health industry structure, 
government policy, consumer preferences and payment mechanisms. 
 
4. Data 
We use annual data from 1993 to 2004 for 51 states in our estimations. Health Care 
Expenditures (HCE) and Gross State Products (GSP) are from the webpage of the Center for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services.13 We analyze the effect of technology on each of the 
following 11 categories reported by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services: Personal 
health care, hospital care, physician and clinical services, other professional services, dental 
services, home health care, prescription drugs, other non-durable medical products, durable 
medical products, nursing home care, and other personal health care.14 We obtain state 
                                               
11
 One other advantage of the aggregate health spending data is that, it is less skewed than the patient level 
spending.  
12
 Lichtenberg uses the same proxy in Lichtenberg (2001) 
13
 http://www.cms.hhs.gov/  
14 See Appendix A for the definitions of these categories.  
 
 8 
populations and GDP implicit price deflators to calculate the real per capita variables as well 
as the percentage of the population over age 65 from the websites of the U.S. Census Bureau 
and Bureau of Economic Analysis, respectively. We obtain insurance coverage data from U.S. 
Census Bureau website. As stated there “private health insurance is coverage by a health plan 
provided through an employer or union or purchased by an individual from a private health 
insurance company, and the government health insurance includes plans funded by 
governments as the federal, state, or local level. The major categories of government health 
insurance are Medicare, Medicaid, the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), 
military health care, state plans, and the Indian Health Service.” We make use of “Ambulatory 
Health Care Data” from National Center for Health Statistics' web site15 to calculate the 
annual drug mentions for the period above.  
Our key variable is the average drug age, which is a measure for the technological 
progress in the market for drugs. To be more precise, we use the age of the active ingredients 
of the drugs. A relatively lower average active ingredient age indicates newer technology. We 
proceed as follows to calculate the average active ingredient age: First, we calculate the 
annual drug mentions for each drug for our data period. Then, we calculate the total annual 
mentions of each active ingredient. An active ingredient can appear more than once in 
different drugs because of the combination drugs. Next, we match the names of these active 
ingredients with the names of the active ingredients in FDA.16 FDA database has the first 
approval dates of the active ingredients, which we use to determine the ages of the active 
ingredients. Once we have ages of the active ingredients, we calculate the weighted average 
drug age as follows: 
n
i=1
1
( )
   
i i
n
i
i
f Active Ingredient Age
Drug Age
f
=
⋅
=
∑
∑
 
 
where if  is the total number of mentions and ( )iActive Ingredient Age  is the age of the 
thi active ingredient. Unfortunately, Ambulatory Health Care Data does not have the zip 
codes for the drug mentions. Therefore, we were able to calculate the average drug age for 
                                               
15
 http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/about/major/ahcd/ahcd1.htm  
16
 This database is located at http://www.fda.gov/cder/drugsatfda/datafiles/  
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four US regions: Northeast, Midwest, South, and West.17 Accordingly, we assume that the 
average drug age is same for all states in the same region.  
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for our data. Per capita health care expenditure 
is $4024 while $382 of this amount is spent on prescription drugs. Average drug age varies 
between 22.71 years and 23.80 years. Alaska is the youngest state and Florida is the oldest in 
terms of the percentage of population over 65. Only 6% of Alaska residents are older than 65 
while 18% of Floridians are older than 65. Insurance coverage also varies between states. 
New Mexico has the lowest private insurance coverage with 57% and Iowa has the highest 
with 82%. Average of government insurance coverage in US States is 26%.   
 
5. Empirical Methodology 
 We estimate the following panel-data models: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 665it it it it it it i itHCE DrugAge GSP GovIns PrivIns Over tβ β β β β β α ε= + + + + + + +  (1) 
1 2 3 4 5 65it it it it it it i itHCE DrugAge GSP GovIns PrivIns Overβ β β β β α ε∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + +  (2) 
where 1,...,51i =  and 1,...,12t = ; itHCE  is per capita real health care expenditure for each 
category mentioned in the previous section; Drug age  is the weighted average age of the 
active ingredients as described in the previous section; GSP is the per capita real gross state 
product; GovIns and PrivIns are the government and private insurance coverage, respectively; 
Over65 is the percentage of the population over age 65; iα  is the unobserved state effect and 
itε  is the error term. Allowing for the time trend explicitly recognizes that HCE may be 
changing over time for reasons unrelated to the exogenous variables that we use. Our purpose 
is to analyze the long- and short-term effects of the new technology on HCE by estimating 
equations 1 and 2, respectively.  
As is well known, nonstationarity may be a problem for panel data especially when the 
time dimension is long. Many papers in the earlier literature have found that the HCE and 
GSP have unit-roots.18 We applied Levin-Lin-Chu19 test with time trend to HCE and GSP in 
                                               
17
 The states in each region are as follows. Northeast: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont; Midwest: Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Wisconsin; South: Alabama, 
Arkansas, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North 
Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia; West: Arizona, California, 
Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, Wyoming, Alaska, Hawaii 
18
 See for example, Gerdtham and Lothgren(2000), and Wang and Rettenmaier(2006) 
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equation (1). The method described in Ng and Perron (2001) produces optimal lag lengths of 
0, 1, or 2, and accordingly, we have employed unit-root test for lags 0, 1, and 2. Appendix B, 
Panel A reports Levin-Lin-Chu unit-root test results. For almost all our variables, unit-root is 
rejected at the 1% level. Karlson and Löthgren (2000) states that “panel unit root tests can 
have high power when a small fraction of the series is stationary and may lack power when a 
large fraction is stationary. The acceptance or rejection of the null is thus not sufficient 
evidence to conclude that all series have a unit root or that all are stationary.” Therefore, we 
also employed individual unit-root test for each state. Since unit-root tests are shown to have 
low power,20 to support the results of Levin-Lin-Chu test, we employed KPSS test in which 
the null hypothesis is that the series is stationary. Appendix B, Panel B presents the 
percentage of states for which the variable’s stationarity is not rejected. At the 5% level, on 
average, stationarity of 85% of the states (i.e., 43 states) is not rejected. Stationarity is not a 
problem for equation 2, as the first differences of the HCE and GSP are stationary.  
 We estimate equations (1) and (2) by using the fixed effects regression methods and 
report the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors obtained by using the Huber-White 
sandwich estimator. Using AR1 or panel-specific AR1 autocorrelation structure produces 
qualitatively and quantitatively similar results.  
 
6. Results and Discussion 
The focus of this study is the influence of innovation in pharmaceutical sector on 
health spending. As we have discussed earlier, we use the average drug age prescribed in 
each region as a proxy for the diffusion of new technologies. The presumption is that the 
smaller the value of “drug age” the higher the technological level of the pharmaceutical 
products. 
First column of Table 2 reports the estimation results for the effect of drug age on per 
capita total health expenditures. The positive and statistically significant coefficient of the 
variable “drug age” suggests that the newer the drugs prescribed in a state are, the lower the 
total per capita health spending in that state. This implies that newer drugs not only increase 
the quality of medical care but also actually lower the total health expenditures. Usually 
newer drugs have lower side effects, thus patients would be willing to pay more for them. 
Moreover, due to treatment expansion effects, newer drugs would expand the potential patient 
                                                                                                                                                   
19
 Levin, Lin, and Chu (2002) 
20
 This is especially a problem for our data set that has 12 time series observations.  
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pool. Naturally, as the number of patients to be treated increases, the total treatment costs also 
increases. However, similar to the results found in the literature that we have discussed earlier, 
our findings imply that the newer medicines are so effective that even if there are more 
patients to be treated and each patient is willing to pay more for the lower side effects, the 
total spending decreases. However, earlier studies generally use individual and/or event level 
data; therefore, they do not consider the treatment expansion effects. Since we use aggregate 
state level data, our results are stronger. As an example, a one-year decrease in the average 
age of prescribed drugs causes per capita health expenditures to decrease by $31.92. This 
amounts to a significant reduction of $171,974,723 for an average state population of 
5,387,038 for our sample period.  
The estimated coefficients of other exogenous variables are generally inline with the 
prior expectations. The positive coefficient on per capita income suggests that on average, 
patients of wealthier states spent more on health care because they are willing and able to do 
so. In addition, sickness or death is costlier for them than the residents of lower income states 
due to working productivity differences. Indeed, the positive relationship between income and 
health spending is a common result found in the health expenditure literature.  
Interestingly, we find a positive (negative) relationship between the percentage of 
government (private) insurance coverage and the HCE. One possible reason is that the cost 
containment strategies of private insurance firms are more successful than that of the public 
agencies.  However, it is also possible that the private insurance companies select the 
relatively low cost patients, and government insurance is generally for the poor and old who 
have a higher possibility of getting sick and who need more medical care.     
The percentage of the population over 65 has a positive relationship with the health 
expenditures as expected. The older the state population the more higher the average health 
spending. Time trend is also positive and significant. Even after controlling for income, 
insurance, demographic effects and the technological improvements in pharmaceuticals, the 
health expenditures still rise as time passes. Cost increasing technological improvements on 
other areas of medical care could be a reason for that.21 Alternatively, modern life style, which 
does not require physical activity, encourages unhealthy diet, and causes stress could be the 
cause of health problems and higher health care spending.22 Finally, there might be more 
subtle influences of demographic shifts on health spending that are measured poorly by the 
                                               
21
 See Pammolli et all (2005) for a detailed review of effects of technological progress on health spending.  
22
 See McGinnis and Foege (1993) for an analysis of lifestyle on health outcomes. 
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demographic variable that we employ, which is the percentage of population over 65. 
In the second column of the Table 2, the health expenditures on pharmaceutical drugs 
is the dependent variable. As expected, relatively newer drugs cost more. The negative 
coefficient of “drug age” indicates that the states in which relatively newer drugs are 
prescribed spent more on pharmaceuticals. This result is parallel to the earlier studies. Newer 
drugs are more expensive than older ones. A one-year decrease in the average age of 
prescribed drugs causes the per capita health expenditures on pharmaceutical drugs to 
increase by $6.4.  
On the third column of Table 2, non-drug health expenditures is the dependent 
variable. The hypothesis we test in this regression is that the newer drugs save money since 
they lower the expenditures on other types of medical services like physician services, 
hospital stays, and surgical operations. The positive coefficient of drug age implies that the 
data confirm our hypothesis. Higher technology (newer) drugs are more effective than the 
relatively older ones, which cause the patients who take them to utilize other types of medical 
services less.  
Table 3 reports the estimated coefficient of “drug age” on each HCE category reported 
by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, as discussed in Section 4.23   
Technological improvements in pharmaceuticals reduce the hospital care and home health 
care expenditures the most. Hospital care spending category includes revenues received for all 
services provided by hospitals to patients. Home health care includes medical care services 
delivered in the home-by-home health agencies.24 Probably physicians are both substitutes 
and complements for prescription drugs. The results also suggest that spending on other non-
durable medical products is increasing with the newer drugs. The category of other non-
durable medical products includes items such as bandages, surgical and medical instruments 
and nonprescription drugs. Negative sign of the coefficient is probably due to mechanical 
reasons since drug age variable also includes the age of nonprescription drugs. Similar to 
prescription drugs, younger and newer nonprescription drugs are more expensive than the 
older ones so as the drug age variable gets bigger the expenditure on nonprescription drugs 
declines. 
                                               
23
 We only report and discuss the estimated coefficient of the variable “drug age”. Full regression results are 
available from the authors upon request. 
24
 See Appendix A for detailed descriptions of the HCE categories. 
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Table 4 reports the results from estimating equation 2 that employs first differences of 
all variables. In a way, this technique will indicate the short-run effects of newer drugs on 
total health spending.  The results are similar to the ones from our earlier estimations. Newer 
drugs decrease the total health spending. Short run estimations also confirm our hypothesis, 
which states that newer drugs are so effective that they lower the demand for other types of 
medical care and reduce total health care expenditures. We see similar results when we look 
at the short run effects of drug age on various categories of health care expenditures, reported 
in Table 5. Newer drugs reduce hospital care and home health care expenditures while 
increasing non-durable medical products spending. In addition, newer pharmaceutical 
products also lower the expenditure on durable medical products in the short run. 
 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we studied the influence of the technological improvement in 
pharmaceutical technology on health care spending using US State level panel data. We find 
that even if newer drugs are more expensive than their predecessors, they are much more 
effective so that they reduce total health expenditures by lowering the need for other types of 
medical services.  
Earlier studies on the subject have not analyzed the treatment expansion effects, i.e., 
the ability to treat hitherto untreatable patients, of the new drugs. Treatment expansion effects 
almost certainly would increase the total health expenditures unlike the treatment substitution 
effects. Some of the earlier studies found that newer drugs lower the per patient health 
expenditures. However, many new drugs also expand the potential patient pool. Thus in 
theory, even if new drugs lower per patient expenditures they could increase the total health 
expenditures in a state by treating hitherto untreatable patients.  However, our results indicate 
that is not the case for US States. By using aggregate data, we show that the newer drugs 
lower total health expenditures in a state.  
Although most health economists believe that the rising trend in health spending is 
partly due to improvement in health technologies, many studies including ours conclude that 
the technological improvement in pharmaceutical products does not rise the health spending 
but reduces it. This apparent controversy needs an explanation. Many studies have shown that 
input use in health production is not efficient everywhere.  Fisher et al (2003a, 2003b) 
conclude that high spending differences between states are almost entirely due to greater 
frequency of physician visits, more frequent use of specialist consultations, more frequent 
 14 
tests and minor procedures, and greater use of the hospital and intensive care unit. Moreover, 
they also conclude that the pattern of practice observed in higher-spending regions does not 
result in improved survival, slower decline in functional status, or improved satisfaction with 
care.  These conclusions imply that high spending regions use wrong types of technologically 
advanced medical goods and services, since the government officials play a significant role in 
planning of the medical markets.  
Our results suggest that regulatory and reimbursement policies toward technologically 
better medical goods and services should be reconsidered, and usage of newer drugs should be 
encouraged more than usage of newer versions of non-pharmaceutical medical goods and 
services.    
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Table 1. Summary Statistics
Regions
Total
HCE
HCE on 
Pharmaceuticals Income
Drug
Age
% Govt.
Insurance
% Priv.
Insurance % >65
Midwest 4,054 383 31,105 23.30 24.29 77.83 13.40
Northeast 4,500 435 34,631 22.71 25.73 74.65 13.74
South 4,146 414 34,088 22.80 28.37 67.58 12.68
West 3,508 302 32,316 23.80 25.99 69.64 11.15
States
Alabama 3,836 456 25,378 22.80 27.40 70.21 13.08
Alaska 4,302 307 43,831 23.80 32.30 64.91 5.51
Arizona 3,289 296 28,890 23.80 27.85 63.97 13.16
Arkansas 3,501 375 24,739 22.80 31.52 63.60 14.24
California 3,631 282 34,669 23.80 25.93 62.66 10.81
Colorado 3,661 275 35,983 23.80 20.17 74.25 9.93
Connecticut 4,928 467 43,882 22.71 23.65 78.19 13.99
Delaware 4,463 479 48,730 22.80 25.08 75.07 12.91
D. of Columbia 8,738 322 103,447 22.80 31.23 63.55 13.10
Florida 4,288 431 28,476 22.80 29.93 64.90 17.91
Georgia 3,701 382 32,873 22.80 24.63 68.54 9.79
Hawaii 3,926 327 33,950 23.80 32.12 73.56 13.14
Idaho 2,972 310 25,801 23.80 23.97 72.41 11.41
Illinois 3,926 373 35,490 23.30 22.57 74.88 12.29
Indiana 3,898 431 30,290 23.30 21.67 78.21 12.52
Iowa 3,788 370 29,974 23.30 22.63 81.87 15.02
Kansas 3,818 386 29,576 23.30 27.13 76.40 13.40
Kentucky 3,916 484 27,292 22.80 30.53 69.18 12.55
Louisiana 4,004 416 28,629 22.80 28.73 61.48 11.53
Maine 4,232 409 26,459 22.71 29.38 72.66 14.13
Maryland 4,078 421 32,927 22.80 21.92 76.68 11.38
Massachusetts 5,143 417 39,496 22.71 25.65 74.17 13.79
Michigan 3,766 415 31,261 23.30 24.90 76.78 12.36
Minnesota 4,404 362 35,129 23.30 21.24 81.11 12.27
Mississippi 3,452 396 22,442 22.80 31.05 63.14 12.24
Missouri 4,164 382 30,163 23.30 25.39 76.07 13.67
Montana 3,552 302 23,564 23.80 28.92 69.29 13.38
Nebraska 4,009 393 31,935 23.30 25.51 77.72 13.71
Nevada 3,512 329 36,346 23.80 20.93 71.04 11.29
New Hampshire 4,001 364 33,075 22.71 21.07 79.48 12.01
New Jersey 4,320 472 39,504 22.71 20.98 75.09 13.42
New Mexico 3,203 251 27,841 23.80 31.41 57.36 11.47
New York 4,924 454 39,008 22.71 28.11 66.43 13.15
North Carolina 3,830 428 32,014 22.80 27.79 69.23 12.35
North Dakota 4,567 384 27,541 23.30 26.90 77.32 14.64
Ohio 4,150 404 30,977 23.30 24.20 76.34 13.33
Oklahoma 3,514 367 25,360 22.80 29.51 65.42 13.38
Oregon 3,594 284 30,669 23.80 25.38 72.95 13.15
Pennsylvania 4,528 460 30,765 22.71 25.78 77.47 15.68
Rhode Island 4,602 503 30,979 22.71 28.03 74.90 15.03
South Carolina 3,619 405 26,957 22.80 28.04 69.41 12.13
South Dakota 4,088 314 29,741 23.30 27.04 76.87 14.39
Tennessee 4,281 482 30,125 22.80 32.11 67.96 12.52
Texas 3,640 320 32,781 22.80 22.60 61.87 10.05
Utah 3,022 306 28,292 23.80 18.07 78.75 8.70
Vermont 3,824 367 28,509 22.71 28.96 73.50 12.46
Virginia 3,518 383 34,581 22.80 26.35 73.57 11.22
Washington 3,754 329 34,440 23.80 26.26 73.09 11.44
West Virginia 4,096 487 22,741 22.80 33.93 65.04 15.24
Wisconsin 4,066 382 31,177 23.30 22.27 80.38 13.17
Wyoming 3,190 322 35,839 23.80 24.58 71.05 11.51
This table reports summary statistics calculated by using annual data from 1993 to 2004 for 51 US states. HCE and
income are the per capita real health care expenditure and income in dollars; Drug Age is the average drug age. The
last three columns are the percentage of government insurance, private insurance and percentage of the population
over age 65, respectively.
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Table 2. Effects of Drug Age on Health Expenditure   
        
This table reports results from estimation of equation 1 by using the fixed effects regression. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denotes 
significance levels at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
        
        
        
        
 
Dependent Variables 
  
Exogenous Variables 
Total Health 
Expenditures 
Per Capita 
Per Capita Health 
Expenditures on 
Pharmaceuticals 
Per Capita Health 
Expenditures on 
Non-Drug Medical 
Care  
Intercept 1220.1712* 552.3330*** 667.8369    
  (635.3003)  (133.0223)  (573.5077)   
Real Income 0.0123** -0.0023** 0.0146 ***  
  (0.0054)  (0.001)  (0.0052)   
Drug age 31.9238*** -6.3962*** 38.3200 ***  
  (9.3561)  (1.8677)  (8.5216)   
Government Insurance 18.3551*** 4.4657*** 13.8895 ***  
  (4.1664)  (0.7790)  (3.85)   
Private Insurance 
-16.2455*** -0.1093  -16.1361 ***  
  (3.612)  (0.8611)  (3.2764)   
Over 65 122.7671*** -24.9576*** 147.7248 ***  
  (36.5091)  (6.7061)  (32.9765)   
Time 121.4497*** 39.8055*** 81.6442 ***  
  (5.8745) (1.0623) (5.5571)   
# of Obs. 612  612  612 
   
R2 91.77%  92.83%  88.60% 
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Table 3. Effects of Drug Age on Various Health Expenditure Categories 
      
This table reports the estimated coefficient of the variable Drug Age for each health care category 
from estimation of equation 1 by using the fixed effects regression. Heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denotes significance levels at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
  
     
      
      
      
 
     
Exogenous Variables 
Estimated  
Coefficient 
of Drug Age Adjusted R2   
Total Health Care 31.9238*** 91.77%  
 (9.3561)    
Hospital Care 25.8320*** 75.57%  
 (5.0935)    
Physician and Clinical Services 4.9157 80.35%  
 (4.1335)    
Other Professional Services 0.1057 79.69%  
 (0.651)    
Dental Services 1.1630 89.88%  
 (0.5972)    
Home Health Care 11.9530*** 21.17%  
 (1.2058)    
Prescription Drugs 
-6.3962*** 92.83%  
 (1.8677)    
Other Non-Durable Medical Products -1.0233** 5.81%  
 (0.5135) 
  
 
Durable Medical Products 0.2498 54.54%  
 (0.2258)
   
 
Nursing Home Care 
-1.8216 43.11%  
 (1.6460)
   
 
Other Personal Health Care 
-3.0655 66.81%  
  
(1.6265)
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 21 
Table 4. Short Run Effects of Drug Age on Health Expenditure  
       
This table reports results from estimation of equation 2 by using the fixed effects regression. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denotes 
significance levels at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
       
       
       
       
 
Dependent Variables 
 
Exogenous Variables 
∆(Total Health 
Expenditures Per 
Capita) 
∆(Per Capita 
Health 
Expenditures on 
Pharmaceuticals) 
∆(Per Capita Health 
Expenditures on 
Non-Drug Medical 
Care) 
Intercept 122.0779 *** 34.1757  87.9022*** 
  (8.5622 )  (1.0583)  (8.0828)  
∆(Real Income) 0.0207 ** -0.0007  0.0214** 
  (0.0091)  (0.0008)  (0.0085)  
∆(Drug age) 23.7627 *** -1.0592  24.8219*** 
  (5.5652)  (1.0984)  (5.1682)  
∆(Government Insurance) 3.0362  0.1489  2.8873  
  (2.1535)  (0.3830)  (1.9763)  
∆(Private Insurance) 
-6.0151 *** -0.5812  -5.4339*** 
  (1.7518)  (0.3593)  (1.6130)  
∆(Over 65) 308.8451 *** -8.5133*** 317.3583*** 
  (103.6278)  (10.0655)  (95.5956)  
# of Obs. 612  612  612
  
R2 27.08%  0.87%  31.19%
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Table 5. Short run Effects of Drug Age on Various Health Expenditure Categories 
      
This table reports the estimated coefficient of the variable ∆(Drug Age) for each health care category 
from estimation of equation 2 by using the fixed effects regression. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denotes significance levels at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively.  
 
     
      
      
      
 
     
Exogenous Variables 
Estimated  
Coefficient 
of ∆(Drug Age) Adjusted R2   
∆(Total Health Care) 23.7627 *** 27.08%  
 (5.5652)    
∆(Hospital Care) 14.8053 *** 24.74%  
 (3.3580)    
∆(Physician and Clinical Services) 1.0508 1.63%  
 (2.8826)    
∆(Other Professional Services) 
-0.1574 5.98%  
 (0.5303)    
∆(Dental Services) 1.1927 ** 2.78%  
 (0.6386)    
∆(Home Health Care) 6.3186 *** 17.48%  
 (0.8170)    
∆(Prescription Drugs) 
-1.0592 * 0.87%  
 (1.0984)    
∆(Other Non-Durable Medical Products) -0.4411 *** 15.75%  
 (0.2032) 
  
 
∆(Durable Medical Products) 0.5777 *** 22.72%  
 (0.1456) 
   
 
∆(Nursing Home Care) 0.2531 7.91%  
 (1.0056) 
   
 
∆(Other Personal Health Care) 1.2366 ** 2.53%  
  
(0.6689) 
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Appendix A. Definitions of Health Care Expenditure Categories Reported by the Center 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
 
 
Following definitions of the categories of the health care expenditures are extracted from the 
links below:  
• http://www.cms.hhs.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/prov-methodology2004.pdf  
• http://www.cms.hhs.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/dsm-04.pdf.  
 
 
1. Personal Health Care: "Personal health care" is comprised of therapeutic goods or 
services rendered to treat or prevent a specific disease or condition in a specific person. 
2. Hospital Care: Hospital care spending is defined to cover revenues received for all 
services provided by hospitals to patients. Thus, expenditures include revenues received to 
cover room and board, ancillary services such as operating room fees, services of resident 
physicians, inpatient pharmacy, hospital-based nursing home care, hospital-based home 
health care and fees for any other services billed by the hospital. 
3. Physician and Clinical Services: The expenditures for physician services are estimated 
in three pieces: (1) expenditures in private physician offices and clinics and specialty 
clinics that include family planning centers, outpatient mental health and substance abuse 
centers, all other outpatient care facilities, and kidney dialysis centers.  ; (2) fees of 
independently billing laboratories; and (3) clinics operated by the U.S. Department of 
Veterans Affairs (DVA) and the U.S. Indian Health Service. 
4. Other Professional Services: "Other professional services" covers spending for services 
provided by health practitioners other than physicians and dentists. Professional services 
include those provided by private-duty nurses, chiropractors, podiatrists, optometrists and 
physical, occupational and speech therapists, among others.  
5. Dental Services: Expenditures in Offices and Clinics of Dentists (NAICS 6212) are based 
on State distributions of business receipts from taxable establishments reported in the 
1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, and 2002 CSI (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2005). 
6. Home Health Care: The home health component of the NHEA measures annual 
expenditures for medical care services delivered in the home by freestanding home health 
agencies (HHAs). NAICS 6216 defines home health care providers as private sector 
establishments primarily engaged in providing skilled nursing services in the home, along 
with a range of the following: personal care services; homemaker and companion 
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services; physical therapy; medical social services; medications; medical equipment and 
supplies; counseling; 24-hour home care; occupation and vocational therapy; dietary and 
nutritional services; speech therapy; audiology; and high-tech care, such as intravenous 
therapy. 
7. Prescription Drugs: The category of prescription drugs includes retail sales of human-
use dosage-form drugs, biologicals and diagnostic products. The transactions to purchase 
prescription drugs occur in community pharmacies, grocery store pharmacies, mail-order 
establishments, and mass-merchandising establishments. 
8. Other Non-Durable Medical Products: The category of other non-durable medical 
products includes such items as rubber medical sundries, heating pads, bandages, and 
nonprescription drugs and analgesics. Nonprescription drugs sold over the counter include 
those marketed to the general public and those promoted to the medical professions and 
comprise products such as analgesics, and cough and allergy medications. Finally, 
medical sundries primarily include such items as surgical and medical instruments, 
surgical dressings, and diagnostic products such as needles and thermometers. 
9. Durable Medical Products: Expenditures in this category represent retail sales of items 
such as contact lenses, eyeglasses and other ophthalmic products, surgical and orthopedic 
products, equipment rental, oxygen and hearing aids. Durable products generally have a 
useful life of over three years whereas non-durable products last less than three years. 
10. Nursing Home Care: Expenditures reported in this category are for services provided by 
freestanding nursing homes. These facilities are defined in the 1997 NAICS as private 
sector establishments primarily engaged in providing inpatient nursing and rehabilitative 
services and continuous personal care services to persons requiring nursing care (NAICS 
6231) and continuing care retirement communities with on-site nursing care facilities 
(NAICS 623311). 
11. Other Personal Health Care: Privately funded other personal health care consists of 
industrial in-plant services provided by employers for the health care needs of their 
employees. 
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Appendix B. Unit Root tests    
         
Panel A reports t-statistics from Levin-Lin-Chu unit-root test for the optimal lag lengths of 
0, 1, or 2, produced by the method described in Ng and Perron (2001). The null 
hypothesis is that the variable has a unit root.***,**, and * indicate that unit-root is 
rejected at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Panel B reports the % of states for 
which the variable's stationary is not rejected by a KPSS test in which the null 
hypothesis is that the variable is stationary. 
         
         
         
         
         
Panel A. Levin-Lin-Chu test    
         
 Lags   
Variable 0 1 2   
realhcepercap_1 -6.9535*** -5.0735*** -6.3099 ***   
realhcepercap_2 -7.3137*** -6.8123*** 1.3565    
realhcepercap_3 -7.7661*** -5.2772*** -3.0045 ***   
realhcepercap_4 -6.8513*** -8.0869*** -7.2043 ***   
realhcepercap_5 -10.5225*** -4.2779*** -1.7984 **   
realhcepercap_6 -5.6311*** -8.7841*** -2.3944 ***   
realhcepercap_7 -1.4149* -2.0435** -7.4251 ***   
realhcepercap_8 -5.4724*** -8.9696*** -14.6721 ***   
realhcepercap_9 -6.3982*** -11.7145*** -15.3161 ***   
realhcepercap_10 -8.5772*** -9.3637*** -7.2259 ***   
realhcepercap_11 -5.1288*** -12.4175*** -3.6509 ***   
realhcepercap_1_7 -7.5224*** -5.5610*** -5.6627 ***   
percaprealinc -3.9461*** -4.2670*** -1.4060 *   
         
Panel B. KPSS test        
         
Variable 5%: 2.5%: 1%:      
RealHCEperCap_1 82.35 100 100     
RealHCEperCap_2 78.43 100 100     
RealHCEperCap_3 74.51 100 100     
RealHCEperCap_4 58.82 58.82 58.82     
RealHCEperCap_5 92.16 98.04 98.04     
RealHCEperCap_6 98.04 98.04 98.04     
RealHCEperCap_7 86.27 100 100     
RealHCEperCap_8 90.2 100 100     
RealHCEperCap_9 100 100 100     
RealHCEperCap_10 90.2 98.04 98.04     
RealHCEperCap_11 84.31 96.08 100     
RealHCEperCap_1_7 88.24 100 100     
PerCapRealInc 90.2 96.08 98.04     
 
 
